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EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION WHERE PROPERTY
USE RESTRICTED BY DEED
Board of County Comm'rs v. Thormyer
169 Ohio St. 291, 159 N.E2d 612 (1959)
A portion of land held by county commissioners by virtue of a deed
executed to them in 1914 was appropriated by the Acting Director of
Highways for use as a limited access relocation and improvement of a state
route. The fee simple title was conditioned upon the continued use of the
land as a children's home, with a reversionary interest in the grantor for
breach of these restrictions. The common pleas court awarded compensa-
tion and damages based on evidence as to the land's use for commercial
purposes, a position subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals. The
Ohio Supreme Court, in reaffirming this decision, held that an award based
on value for commercial purposes is valid, notwithstanding that the land
was held under a deed containing restrictions against using the land for
purposes other than as a childrens home.'
The terms "property," "land" and "interest" are often used inter-
changeably, but they may convey widely differing meanings 2 In analyzing
the present decision, those distinctions must be kept firmly in mind. It is
necessary in any eminent domain proceeding to recognize (1) what interest
it is that the state is acquiring in the land,3 (2) whose interests are affected
thereby, and (3) that the question of valuation of the land and the question
of whose interests are affected thereby are distinctly separate, though inter-
related, problems.
The supreme court ascribes its decision to three basic arguments: com-
pensation should be based upon what the land is worth and not the value
of the ownership interest of a particular party; as between owner and
appropriator, the former should be allowed the benefit of any resulting
windfall;4 the grantor's intent would have directed the result reached in
this caseY
1 Board of County Comm'rs v. Thormyer, 169 Ohio St. 291, 159 N.E.2d 612 (1959).
2 For purposes of this note, use of the word "land" will refer to the physical
substance. "Property" and "interest" both refer to the aggregate of rights which the
owner has in the land. Although not applicable to every case cited, this usage seems
to be generally consistent with the language employed by the court in the instant case.
3 In condemnation proceedings by the state highway director, a perpetual easement
is acquired by the state. Ohio Rev. Code § 5501.11 (1953).
4 The reasoning employed by the court on this point seems to disregard its first
argument entirely. The concept "windfall" is predicated, in the words of the court,
upon the difference between the market value of the property and "what the property
was worth to him." The latter measure is nothing but that previously rejected measure,
the value of the ownership interest of a particular party.
5 Although plausible, this position necessitates constructing an intent for the
grantor when none is expressed and possibly never existed. A related consideration is
what restriction, if any, may be placed upon the award granted to the holder of the
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A proceeding for the condemnation of private property for public uses
is a proceeding in rem0 and not in personam. The proceeding in court is one
for the ascertainment of the amount of compensation to be paid for the land
appropriated.7 In the present case, there is more than one party with an
interest in the land. The restriction upon use gives rise to a division of
ownership.8 Although the incidents of ownership are divided, condemnation
by the state results in damage to the entire fee, affecting both the rever-
sionary and the commissioner's interests. Where there are several interests
in a single piece of land, the general rule is that the value of such land is
determined in gross, and the award is then apportioned among the various
claimants. 9
The compensation required by law'0 to be paid when land is taken for
public use is that sum of money which will compensate the owner or owners
for their fee or lesser estate in the land actually taken or appropriated, that
is, the fair market value of the land taken." When, as in the instant case,
the condemnation proceeding affects not merely the "restricted tenure,"'
but also the possibility of reverter, it seems clear that the restrictive condi-
tions may be disregarded in the ascertainment of a just compensation.
Having affected all the interests in the land without restriction as to its use,
the state must pay compensation evaluated not with reference to what the
property is worth for any particular use, but for what it is worth generally for
any and all uses for which it might be suitable, including the most valuable
defeasible title. The amount has sometimes been placed in trust to accomplish a purpose
intended by the grantor. In re County of Westchester, 243 App. Div. 707, 277 N.Y.S.
988 (1935).
6 Scott v. Columbus, 109 Ohio St. 193, 142 N.E. 25 (1923), cert. denied 265
U.S. 580 (1923), error dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 269 U.S. 528 (1925) ; Martin
v. Columbus, 101 Ohio St. 1, 127 N.E. 411 (1920); Portage County v. Gates, 83 Ohio
St. 19, 93 N.E. 255 (1910); Cupp v. Seneca County, 19 Ohio St. 173 (1869).
7 Thormyer v. Irvin, 170 Ohio St. 276 (1960); Grant v. Hyde Park, 67 Ohio St.
166, 65 N.E. 891 (1902); overruled on another ground in Cincinnati v. Shuller, 160
Ohio St. 95, 113 N.E.2d 353 (1953); 19 Ohio Jur. 2d "Eminent Domain" § 148 (1956).
8 The authorities cited by the court, 169 Ohio St. at 295, are distinguishable in that
the covenants giving rise to the restrictions in those cases made no provision for rever-
sion to the grantor.
9 Thormyer v. Joseph Evans Ice Cream Co., 167 Ohio St. 463, 150 N.E.2d 30
(1958); Queen City Realty Co. v. Linzell, 166 Ohio St. 249, 142 N.E.2d 219 (1957);
Sowers v. Schaeffer, 152 Ohio St. 65, 87 N.E.2d 257 (1949); 19 Ohio Jur. 2d "Eminent
Domain" § 119 (1956).
10 Ohio Const. art. 1, § 19.
"1 Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Funk, 134 Ohio St. 302, 16 N.E.2d
454 (1938); Powers v. Hazelton & L.R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 429 (1878); Dodson v. Cin-
cinnati, 34 Ohio St. 276, affirming 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 504 (1877); Giesy v. C.W. & Z.
Railroad Co., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854); In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway
Purposes, 93 Ohio App. 179, 112 N.E.2d 411 (1952), dismissed for want of debatable
question, 158 Ohio St. 285, 109 N.E.2d 3 (1952).
12 This is the characterization of the commissioners' property interest employed by
the court.
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uses to which it can reasonably and practically be adapted. 13 Sowers v.
Schaeffer'4 held that valuation could be based on the most valuable uses to
which the land can "reasonably and practically be adapted."
Although his interest is damaged by the condemnation, a person holding
the possibility of reverter frequently will not.be held entitled to a share of
the award because of the impossibility of performance of a condition as to
the use of the premises or because the reversionary interest is deemed to be so
slight as not to admit of compensation. 15 The usual procedure in cases of
the present nature is the ascertainment of damages and compensation for the
condemnation as though the estate were a possessory estate in fee simple
absolute and an award of the entire amount to the owner of the estate in fee
simple defeasible. 16 However inconsistent this practice may seem when
compared with the previously discussed method of valuation, the award itself
should not be affected because, as the court notes in its opinion, "the deter-
mination of the extent of those interests of ownership is a matter of no
concern to the appropriator of the property or to the jury called upon to
determine the amount of the award."' 7
John C. McDonald
13 Sowers v. Schaeffer, supra note 9; Cincinnati & S. Ry. v. Exrs. of Longworth, 30
Ohio St. 108 (1876); Goodin v. Cincinnati & W. Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 98 Am.
Dec. 95 (1868) ; 19 Ohio Jur. 2d "Eminent Domain" § 122 (1956).
14 Sowers v. Schaeffer, supra note 9.
"5 United States v. 2,086 Acres, 46 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. S.C. 1942); United States
v. 1,119.15 Acres, 44 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Ill. 1942); First Reformed Dutch Church v.
Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y.S. 132 (1924), appeal dismissed 299 N.Y.
625, 147 N.E. 222 (1925); Cincinnati v. Babb, 4 Ohio Dec. 464 (1893);
Restatement, 'Property" § 53, comment b (1936). But see United States v. 2,184.81
Acres, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942); Cincinnati v. Smythe, 570 Ohio App. 70, 11
N.E.2d 274 (1937); Restatement, "Property" § 53, comment c (1936).
16 United States v. 1,119.15 Acres and United States v. 2,086 Acres, supra note 15.
'7 169 Ohio St. at 297.
